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Abstract
The dynamic behavior of a multiagent system in which the agent size si is variable it
is studied along a Lotka-Volterra approach. The agent size has hereby for meaning
the fraction of a given market that an agent is able to capture (market share).
A Lotka-Volterra system of equations for prey-predator problems is considered, the
competition factor being related to the difference in size between the agents in a one-
on-one competition. This mechanism introduces a natural self-organized dynamic
competition among agents. In the competition factor, a parameter σ is introduced
for scaling the intensity of agent size similarity, which varies in each iteration cycle.
The fixed points of this system are analytically found and their stability analyzed
for small systems (with n = 5 agents). We have found that different scenarios are
possible, from chaotic to non-chaotic motion with cluster formation as function
of the σ parameter and depending on the initial conditions imposed to the system.
The present contribution aim is to show how a realistic though minimalist nonlinear
dynamics model can be used to describe market competition (companies, brokers,
decision makers) among other opinion maker communities.
1 Introduction
Multiagent systems and complex networks are very active and growing areas of
research [1,2,3] with applications found in a diverse variety of problems found
in e.g. engineering systems [4], biological systems [5,6,7,8], neural networks [9],
socioeconomic systems [10,11,12,13,14,15].
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Fig. 1. Interaction function γ vs. agent difference in size (si − sj), for different scaling
similarity parameter (σ) values.
Let it be recalled that growth, innovation pace of life in cities are scaled using
the population size [16] as urban metrics. Similarly, biological metrics such
as number, size and metabolic rate of cells are also scaled using body sizes
[17,18,19]. In multimarket economies, size is also relevant beside the number
of competitors, entry barriers, etc. [20]. Thus many phenomena, outside well
known condensed matter physics, related to size, appear in areas that, at first
sight, do not have something in common; like sociology, biology, economy, etc.,
but for which similar mathematical models can be used in fact [21,22].
In complex networks, individuals can behave in two opposite ways: as coop-
erators or defectors as stated in the N-person prisoner dilemma [23]. Recently
much attention has been given to the emergence of ”cooperation” in public
goods games [24,25], and more generally in ”evolution theory”. As has been
used for conflict resolution according to game theory [26], as well as reference
[27,28] in the so-called theory of the organization. There, they treat the con-
flict between groups within an organization and conflict between organizations,
these conflicts, which could be interpreted as a situation of competition for ex-
ample, are produced by: conflicting objectives and have different perceptions
of reality. So the conflict occurs when an agent or agent group experiences a
decision problem. Negotiation and politics are the procedures used by the or-
ganization to manage these conflicts and lead to tensions in status and power
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Fig. 2. Two possible simulations of the time evolution of the size of agents for two
different sets of initial conditions (IC), both for σ = 0.1, are shown. On top, it
is shown when agent sizes are initially close to each other (Table 1, case IV). On
bottom, it is shown for widely spread IC (Table 1, case VI).
systems. If those who are formally more powerful prevail, they give rise to
a stronger perception of differences in status and power, if not sustained its
position is weakened. To address the conflict between organizations has used
the theory of negotiation, albeit with a gap that empirical and negotiation
situations are so complex that it is not possible to develop a theory general.
Within this framework we can also quote [29,30]. Which defines five forces that
determine the competitive strategy of an organization, within them the bar-
gaining power and market threats result in the rivalry of existing competitors.
Finally one of the latest Nobel laureate in economics, [31,32,33] referred to
the formation of firms, companies, rather than individual goods and services
marketed by itself, this is given by the structure of transaction costs.
In the present paper, we focus on a competitive scenario based on a set of
differential equations as it will be explained in Section 2. In short, we start from
a Lotka-Volterra set of equations for describing prey-predator [34] situations
[6,35], i.e. a system of n agents competing for some common resource. An
original constraint is imposed on the agent dynamics, i.e. an increase in size
is favored in order to obtain resources, while an agent decreasing size implies
the loss or lack of getting such resources. By size we mean something like the
fraction of a given market that an agent has, i.e. its market share in economy.
Other intuitive notions of size are easily imagined in many other systems.
Let us mention that in [11], a different generalization of the Lotka-Volterra
3
Fig. 3. Agent sizes si vs. σ values, in the n = 5 case. In the overlap region
0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 0.13, cases VI and IV coexist. Similarly in the overlap region
0.22 ≤ σ ≤ 0.36, cases IV and II coexist; see notations in Table 1.
model [35] to the n agent (competitor) case was used for describing the infor-
mation electronic web’s dynamics. Two behavior states were found depend-
ing on a global interaction parameter: on one hand, a stationary state exists
in which only one agent gets all the available resources (”winner takes all”)
[11,12], while the rest of agents gets nothing; on the other hand, there is an-
other stationary state where the resource is fairly shared among all agents
(”sharing the market”). In several works [10,23,36,37,38], spatial configura-
tions of agents were also considered allowing them to interact only with a
limited set of neighbors, thereby resulting in spatially distributed patterns as
stationary states of the system [10]. Let us also finally cite [39] in which the
interaction coefficient of the model of [11] has a linear form, giving rise to the
effect ”riches get richer”.
Practically we introduce an interaction function (IF) in the Lotka-Volterra
model which depends on an agent size in order to let the agents compete
among themselves in a self-adjusting way. This contrasts with assuming a
fixed interaction coefficient like in the previously cited references. That means
that the competition process and outcome are now intertwined variables since
they are related to changes in the size of agents. A parameter σ that governs
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Fig. 4. Maximum absolute of eigenvalue real part of the Jacobian matrix vs. σ value
when n = 5. The overlap regions 0.05 ≤ σ ≤ 0.13 of eigenvalues for cases VI and
IV, and 0.22 ≤ σ ≤ 0.36, corresponding to cases IV and II are shown. See notes in
Table 1 for following the case properties.
the spread in competition strength, i.e. for scaling the difference between the
size of agents, is also introduced. The IF modification will be shown to lead to
a dynamics of the system characterized by a time dependent competition. As σ
is kept fix along each simulation, we are able to see how different agent groups
compete among themselves. In short, this means that the IF is varying with
time, accordingly with the size of agents is changing, implies an intrinsically
novel dynamics of competition.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the mathematical model is
outlined; in Section 3, the system fixed points are theoretically analyzed and
an illustrative example for a system with a small number (five) of agents is
provided; in Section 4, simulation results are presented for the case of a larger
number (ten) of agents, in order to establish the qualitative validity of the
quantitative findings obtained for the small size systems. This allows us in
Section 5, to outline the novelty of this work and emphasize some conclusion.
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Fig. 5. Simulation of the time evolution of the size of 10 agents for two values of
σ. On top, it is shown for σ = 0.01, there are four clusters each containing 1, 2, 3
and 4 agents respectively. On bottom, it is shown for σ = 0.1, see the change in
asymptotic behavior when σ grows, - from top to bottom.
2 Peer-to-peer competition model
Let us consider a system with n agents competing for some common resource,
as in a generalized predator-prey model or Lotka-Volterra model studied in
[11]. On this model, a competition parameter, γ, is introduced, which allows
the agents to compete among themselves in a self-adjusting way. The system
is governed by the following set of n differential equations:
s˙i = αisi (βi − si)−
∑
i 6=j
γ (si, sj) sisj for i = 1, .., n (1)
where si is the size of agent i in the range 0 < si ≤ 1; s˙i is its time derivative;
αi is the growth rate of agent i if no interaction is present; βi is the maximum
capacity of agent i and γ (si, sj) is the IF hereby defined by:
γ (si, sj) = exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
(2)
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Fig. 6. Simulation of the evolution of the size of ten agents for three different σ
values, greater than in Fig.5, i.e. σ = 0.11, 0.31, and 1.01. Observe that the amount
of agents can vary on various levels, though keeping the total sum of agents equal
to 10; the oscillatory asymptotic behavior has disappeared
in which σ is a global positive parameter which controls/scales the si degree
of similarity in the competition.
Notice that the analytical form in Eq.(2), resembling the Gauss function used
in statistics, has been chosen because it allows both analytical and numeri-
cal approaches; it has many attractive mathematical properties, i.e., it is a
continuously differentiable function allowing us to make a proper theoretical
analysis of the system dynamics. In fact, one could simply require any positive
and even function of the absolute difference of agent sizes ∆ = |si − sj| with
the property that its maximum is located at ∆ = 0 and it is a decreasing func-
tion for positive ∆. We suggest that another case could be the Kac potential
[40]. Other forms can be imagined but to compare them is not the primary
purpose of this paper.
From Eq.(2), we see that the interaction is symmetric and always positive
representing a competitive and fair scenario; the competition factor is max-
imum and equal to one when si = sj. Additionally, we observe that, as the
absolute difference of agent sizes |si − sj| becomes large the competition factor
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tends to be small. Plots of the IF γ (si, sj) versus the absolute difference of
two agent sizes for different values of σ are shown in Fig.1 in order to suggest
quantitatively reasonable values.
As we let the interaction coefficient depends on the difference in agent sizes,
a peer-to-peer competition is imposed, in the sense that agents with a similar
size compete more aggressively than agents with different sizes. The name of
peer-to-peer competition model makes sense in this context, as only agents
with similar sizes are able to compete reciprocally.
We emphasize that this kind of competition is a phenomenon that can be ob-
served in many socioeconomic systems, i.e. the competition is strong among
big companies while the competition is weak between a big company and a
medium or small one. Similarly for banks, hedge funds, pension funds, coun-
tries, etc. Even in poker game, it is the money the player has at his/her disposal
which allows him/her to compete and influence the game.
As it will be shown below, different stationary states emerge as a function
of σ, which are interestingly characterized by agent grouping. Self-organized
clustering as well as different possible scenarios appear, ranging from chaotic
to non-chaotic motion, depending not only on the value of the size similarity
measure but also on the agent size initial condition 1 .
It should be further noticed that, as σ tends to be larger (σ →∞) the similar-
ity of competition tends to be static, i.e. γ (si, sj)→ 1 constant, approaching
to the particular case of ”winner takes the maximum, or almost all”.
In this paper we consider that all agents have the same dynamics properties
restricting our study to the case where αi = 1 and βi = 1 for which the
equations are:
s˙i = si (1− si)−
∑
i 6=j
γ (si, sj) sisj for i = 1, .., n (3)
3 Fixed points analysis
First, the existence of fixed points and a study of their stability are presented.
By definition, a fixed point is a point in the phase space where all the time
derivatives are zero, i.e.,
s˙i = 0 for i = 1, .., n. (4)
1 By initial condition we mean the set of initial agent size values, at simulation
time equal to zero.
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3.1 Trivial fixed points for n arbitrary agents
From Eq.(4), we detect at least three trivial fixed points which are:
(I) si = 0 for i = 1, .., n (all agents with zero size);
(II) si = 1 and sj = 0 for every j 6= i;
(III) si = b for i = 1, .., n (all agents with the same size b)
In the latter case (III), we can directly calculate the corresponding constant
b by using Eq.(3) as follows:
0 = b (1− b)− (n− 1)b2 = 1− bn; whence we necessarily have b = 1
n
.
As usual, for the analysis of a system fixed points stability, one needs to look
at the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J evaluated at the corresponding
fixed points. It is shown that the elements of the Jacobian matrix for the
system are:
[J ](i,k) =
∂s˙i
∂sk
=

1− 2si −
∑
i 6=j
sjγ (si, sj)
[
1− 2
σ2
si (si − sj)
]
for k = i
−siγ (si, sk)
[
1 + 2
σ2
sk (si − sk)
]
for k 6= i.
(5)
If we evaluate the Jacobian matrix at the fixed points (I), from Eq.(5) we
obtain the identity matrix; all its eigenvalues are equal to one (λi = 1) and
therefore it is an unstable fixed point.
Evaluating Eq.(5) at the second type of fixed point (II) for the case with s1 = 1
and s2 = s3 = .. = sn = 0, we obtain that the Jacobian matrix is:
J =

−1 −a −a .. −a
0 1− a 0 .. 0
0 0 1− a .. 0
: : : .. :
0 0 0 .. 1− a

with a = exp (−σ−2) . It can be shown that the eigenvalues of J in this case
are:
λ1 = −1
λ2,3,..,n = 1− a = 1− exp (−σ−2)
(6)
9
From Eq.(6) we can deduce that this fixed point is not stable since it has n−1
positive eigenvalues; this is neither dependent on the number of agents nor on
the value of the parameter σ.
Next, we analyze the stability of the third type of fixed point (III). By following
a procedure similar to the previous one, we obtain the following Jacobian
matrix:
J = 1
n

−1 −1 −1 .. −1
−1 −1 −1 .. −1
−1 −1 −1 .. −1
: : : .. :
−1 −1 −1 .. −1

whose eigenvalues are:
λ1 = −1
λ2,..n = 0
(7)
which reveals that it is not a stable fixed point. 2
Additionally to the fixed points of type (I), (II) and (III) there are many other
points that verify the conditions in Eq.(4). These points are found by seeking
the roots of a set of n non-linear equations.
3.2 Trivial fixed points for a small finite number of agents
In order to illustrate the analysis we restrict ourselves to examine the case of
n = 5 agents. Considering the degeneracy of several solutions, seven possible
states appear in which a different combination in the number of agents can be
involved. In this sense it can be said that such final states can be called ”size
levels” or in short ”levels”. Moreover since several agents can be on the same
level, it can be said that ”clusters” of agents are obtained. Table 1 enumer-
ates these cases and the type of stability; the latter has been determined by
numerically evaluating the Jacobian matrix Eq.(5) at the fixed point through
a Newton-Raphson (NR) algorithm [41].
2 If one wants to be more rigorous, would need to calculate the second order deriva-
tives since the zero eigenvalues do not wholly determine the stability. Our numerical
simulations do not show this fixed point to be a stable one.
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Let us examine the seven cases obtained through the numerical solution of
Eq.(5). They are summarized in Table 1.
• Case I: only one state final size, level, is found to be occupied by the five
agents (5).
• Case II and III two levels appear; with two distributions: called (1-4) and
(2-3) i.e. made either of 1 agent and a group of 4 agents or a group of 2
agents and a group of 3 agents, respectively.
• Likewise Cases IV and V are two distributions with three levels (1-1-3) and
(1-2-2) respectively.
• Case VI has only one distribution with four levels, (1-1-1-2).
• Finally in Case VII again only one distribution is found, now with five levels,
(1-1-1-1-1).
Notice that from Eq.(5) the upper levels are always less occupied than the
lower one. This fact reflects what seems to happen in real life, as ”big players”
are less numerous than small ones. Observe also that the number of levels and
the fixed point stability depend on σ.
It is also found that the result depends on the initial conditions. Indeed, ob-
serve in Fig.2, the time evolution of the si set illustrated when σ = 0.1, n = 5
and for two different sets of initial conditions. As it can be seen, for these
cases, after 1000 iteration (time) steps different states (”levels”) si values are
asymptotically reached. For arbitrary, random, IC we obtain the solution cor-
responding to case VI, i.e. (1-1-1-2). However when the size initial conditions
are imposed to be taken from a narrow range, the resulting solution corre-
sponds to the case IV, i.e. (1-1-3). Since, as in Fig.2, two different stable
solutions can exist for the same σ value, but for two different sets of ini-
tial conditions (IC), this sort of local degeneracy must be stressed: we call it
an overlap region. We emphasize that according to the initial conditions the
population of the final states can be markedly different. This observation is
reinforced when we analyze the agent size si vs. σ, here below.
In Fig.3, the corresponding agent sizes are shown at the stable fixed points as
a function of the parameter σ. In fixed point searching, we have used the NR
method, departing from 100000 random initial conditions looking for the stable
fixed points. The numerical evaluation of the Jacobian matrix at different σ
values has been done through the NR procedure. Any solution that is not a
stable fixed point was discarded. So all the stable fixed point solutions are
considered to be found. It can be observed that there are two overlap regions
in σ space where more than one fixed point exists. In the overlap region 0.05 ≤
σ ≤ 0.13, cases VI and IV coexist. In the overlap region 0.22 ≤ σ ≤ 0.36, cases
IV and II coexist. In simple words, agents with different asymptotic in time
si value, or final level, can be simultaneously found, for a given σ, thus for a
given IF.
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Cases Size at the stationary state Type Stability
Case 1 All agents with the same size one level
5 Non stable
Case II One agent with one size two levels
and the rest of agents with another size
(trivial fixed point) 1 - 4 Stable depending on σ
Case III Two agents with one size two levels
and the rest of agents with another size 2-3 Non stable
Case IV Two agents with one size three levels
and three agents with the same size 1-1-3 Stable depending on σ
Case V One agent with one size, three levels
two agents with another size
and two agents with another size 1-2-2 Non stable
Case VI Two agents with one size four levels
and the rest of agents with different sizes 1-1-1-2 Stable depending on σ
Case VII All agents with different sizes five levels
1-1-1-1-1 Non stable
Table 1
The seven cases emerging from the numerical solution of Eq. (5) by the Newton-
Raphson algorithm are summarized. Cases are ordered according with the number
of final levels and their characteristic stability are enumerated in the last column.
Further explanations are in the text.
Given that absolute eigenvalues determine the strength of the attractor, we
can search for the value of the maximum absolute of eigenvalue real part of
the Jacobian matrix for each fixed point; this result is shown in Fig.4. A
similar feature, i.e. overlap regions, as in Fig.3 is observed as a function of
σ, depending on the IC. Thus it is found that the dynamics of the system
is dominated by the fixed point of the maximum absolute of eigenvalue real
part; the precise dynamics also depends on the initial conditions.
Recall that Cases I, III, V and VII are not stable. However Cases II, IV and
VI show an interesting type of degenerate stability (two possible solutions
coexist within specific ranges of σ) as reported in the previous paragraph.
While unique solutions are found in: (i) case VI for σ ≤ 0.05, (ii) case IV for
0.13 ≤ σ ≤ 0.22 and (iii) case II for 0.36 ≤ σ. Many numerical investigations
lead us to conclude that
• for random initial conditions, i.e. for a widely spread range of initial sizes,
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the solution corresponding to the maximum absolute of eigenvalue real part
appears.
• when the initial conditions are taken from a non uniform, i.e. narrow, dis-
tribution, the solution corresponding to the other eigenvalue emerges.
4 Simulation results for ”large” systems
In this section we present some simulation results for a system with n = 10
agents, all of them varying between 0 and 1 in size. We have made simulations
where the σi parameter has been varied in a logarithmic way, from 0.01 up to
1. In summary, one can observe different dynamics, ranging from the trivial
result with almost no competition, when σ is small in relation to the difference
of agent sizes, passing through oscillatory regimes, cluster formation regimes,
up to the state where only one agent is the biggest and the rest of them remain
at a very low level state, when σ is large.
To solve our differential equations system, we have used a typical algorithm
for numerical integration [41]. The initial size of each agent in each simulation
was randomly chosen from a uniform distribution.
The system evolution for ten agents for σ = 0.01 and σ = 0.10 is shown in
Fig.5. When σ grows, a change in the system behavior occurs. For σ = 0.01,
four size levels having 1.0, 0.5, 0.33 and 0.25 values are obtained populated by
1, 2, 3 and 4 agents respectively. It is found again that small size agents form
more populated clusters. The clusters are formed after a transitory regime.
A similar highly complex behavior can be seen, up to around 500 iterations
for σ = 0.10. For higher time iterations some erratic, oscillations appear. No
asymptotically strictly stable in time solution exists. For very large time one
can consider that a non stable stationary state is reached; it can be conjectured
that the corresponding fixed points are non stable either. The evolution goes
toward a band clustering rather chaotic situation.
However if σ is further increased above 0.10 (Fig.6), the system asymptotically
reaches a stable stationary state, so that a sort of condensation of agents
occurs and a cluster type situation appears, with a densely populated level
at the lowest size. For σ = 0.11, it can be observed that there are 5 clusters
(1-1-1-2-5); for σ = 0.31 there are 3 clusters (1-1-8) and finally for σ = 1.01
only two clusters are present (1-9). It can be seen that agents abandon the
oscillatory behavior, seen at intermediate σ values, in order to form different
groups or clusters with strong internal competition; this case corresponds e.g.
already to the 1-1-1-2-5 set, and is huge in the last case (σ = 1.01) when the
lowest size cluster is made of 9 agents ; recall that the competition factor is
maximum and equal to one when si = sj (Fig.2).
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It can be also observed that further increasing σ induces a systematic decrease
in the number of levels, - the lowest level being always the more crowded. Our
numerical simulation has shown that the situation is found for two levels only,
i.e. σ = 1.01, it emerges when σ is around ' 0.5. This persists for higher σ
values. This behavior in which one agent obtains the highest level while the
rest of agents reaches the lowest common level illustrates that some sort of
monopoly has been configured as the final state of the competition.
5 Conclusions
The main input contribution of this paper consists in the introduction of a
self-organized competition scheme related to agent sizes. The agent size acts
into our context, through the IF, as a limitation of the number of possibilities
for agent interaction or as a constraint. If the difference in sizes is out of the σ
scale they are not able to interact anymore. So they are ”constrained” in some
sense. This constraint allows that only ”players” of similar sizes are able to
or truly compete with each other. A quite simple example is given by a poker
game when, at the end of the game, only those with the same capacity to bet
can be continuing the game. Other cases occur in many finite size markets,
like pharmaceutical companies through drugstores, fuel distribution through
gasoline stations, clothing and specialty goods in supermarket chains.
In the present analysis of the clustering of agents no use is made of tech-
niques like those used physics literature on synchronization [42,43,44,45,46,47],
which have been around for a couple of decades, because we do not use chaos
synchronization in our contribution. Such extensions should nevertheless be
suggested. Our model leads to describe cases when a strong self-organized
feedback scheme essentially occurs, i.e. the number of interacting agents being
a somewhat secondary aspect. As we are dealing with a nonlinear system, the
initial conditions impose severe constraints leading to specific dynamics and a
variety of final stationary states. Indeed several behaviors emerge, going from
one extreme in which a few agents compete with each other, passing through
oscillations with clustering, up to the case of a ”winner takes the top” state,
and all others drop out. This latter state reflects the fact that the IF tends
to a constant value = 1, as the size scale parameter σ increases. It can be
said in simple words that this corresponds to when ”the competition is at its
maximum”.
We have stressed the case of a small number n of agents which seems the
most reasonable practical case [48,49]. The stability analysis for five agents as
presented exemplifies the different dynamics and final state possibilities. Here
it was demonstrated that there exists a critical σ of the system, 0.05 ≤ σ1 ≤
0.13 and 0.22 ≤ σ2 ≤ 0.36, where the solution is no longer unique. It can be
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extrapolated the present findings to other finite number n of agents cases.
As shown in several figures, a clustering phenomenon can be also obtained
in which the competition is in fact between clusters of agents. In market
language, this situation represents the natural segmentation into big, medium,
and small players. We have shown that the segmentation can be extreme, even
of the binary type. From a socioeconomic point of view, this means that a
monopolistic situation is sometimes likely.
We emphasize the relevance of initial conditions, but agree that in general
they are hard to define in socioeconomic systems.
Notice also that even when clusters (in size) appear there still exists competi-
tion among the agents inside the cluster; this competition is stronger at the
lowest size levels, which are the most densely populated. This fact well reflects
the complexity of markets: not only agents with equal sizes are in competition
with those with bigger or smaller sizes, but also they are still in strong com-
petition with each other at their own level. In some sense, the only final state
will be, sooner or later, only one agent at the top, because of the attrition of
the small ones.
Finally and in addition we would like to re-emphasize that the competition
scheme presented here Eq.(2) gives rise to a very complex dynamics, although
based on a simple idea, and on having only one quantity σ, as the regulation
parameter of the different behaviors. This can be put in line with the observed
complexity of evolution of true systems, though is clearly a reductionist view
of the world [50].
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